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A quantile regression model is used to identify the main neighborhood charac-
teristics associated with high foreclosure rates in weak market neighborhoods, 
speciﬁ  cally for two counties in Ohio and one in Pennsylvania. A decomposition 
technique by Machado and Mata (2005) allows separating foreclosure ﬁ  ling rate 
differentials across counties into two components: the ﬁ  rst due to differences in 
the levels of neighborhood characteristics and the second due to differences in 
the model parameters. At higher than median rates, foreclosure rate differentials 
between counties in Ohio are mainly explained by the levels of these character-
istics. However, foreclosure rate differences between counties across states are 
mainly explained by the parameter component, suggesting that state level effects 
might have contributed to shape foreclosure rate outcomes.
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I. Introduction 
Recent studies have contributed to identifying traits and commonalities of high foreclosure 
rate neighborhoods (Grover, Smith and Todd, 2008). Currently, there seems to be a 
consensus in that the mortgage crisis unfolded differently in regions with strong as opposed 
to weak or soft real estate markets. Differences in weak and strong markets lie in the 
economic and housing market conditions under which the crisis took place. The consistent 
home price appreciation from 2000 to 2005 at the national (aggregate) level was driven by 
steeper appreciation in these strong markets, while in soft ones real home prices remained 
virtually unchanged.  As credit was expanded, weak markets with little or negative 
population growth experienced a higher share of subprime originations in areas of 
previously high denial rates (Mian and Sufi, 2008).  Mayer and Pence (2008) also find that 
lending activity in depressed housing markets is more likely to be subprime. At the same 
time, these markets’ high rates of foreclosure were coupled with previous high rates of 
vacancy and abandonment contributing to the worsening of spillover effects in 
neighborhoods (Community Research Partners, 2008). This is the case in Ohio, and 
particularly Cleveland, reported among the top cities in regards to foreclosure rates and 
vacancy.  
However, even among the weaker housing markets, foreclosure rates varied considerably in 
2007. For instance, despite similar conditions in the housing market and demographic 
variables for individuals and neighborhoods in Cuyahoga (Ohio) and Allegheny 
(Pennsylvania), the distributions of census tract foreclosure rates in these counties were 
quite different, with Cuyahoga displaying the largest variation. Thus, it would seem that 
differences in foreclosure rates across these counties can only partly be explained by 
demographic and neighborhood differences.   2
Differences in the regulatory environment across states may also contribute to differences in 
the quality of loans originated, and ultimately, the rates of foreclosure. An effective 
regulatory environment that reduces information asymmetries and promotes a better 
functioning of the markets ultimately enhances net social surplus. In the home mortgage 
market, in particular, lower foreclosure rates may be expected with better regulations. At 
the same time, characteristics such as low income level, high rates of vacancy in the 
neighborhood, and low credit scores are all expected to positively correlate with higher 
neighborhood foreclosure rates. However, all else being equal, an effective regulatory 
environment should be conducive to weakening the negative impact of low income 
individual and neighborhood demographics on foreclosure rates. It is under this framework 
that the impact of regulations is explored here, in its interaction with demographic and 
neighborhood characteristics associated with high foreclosure rates.  Unlike this approach, 
previous studies of the effect of regulations on subprime loan originations or foreclosures 
use indices of state regulatory strength or enforcement and measure their impact after 
accounting for demographic characteristics (Ho and Pennington-Cross, 2005).  
This paper has two main objectives: (a) identify the main neighborhood characteristics 
associated with high foreclosure rates in weak markets neighborhoods, and (b) identify any 
possible differences in the impact of these variables (as measured by model parameters) that 
might explain across versus within state foreclosure rate differences. Since regulatory effects 
are likely to be among the most important state-level effects, findings from this exercise 
would suggest the degree to which differences in regulations contributed to the differences 
in foreclosure rates between Allegheny and two Ohio counties, Cuyahoga and Franklin. 
The methodology to accomplish these objectives can be broken down into three components 
listed here and detailed in the remaining of this section: (1) Estimate quantile regression   3
models of foreclosure rates, since high foreclosure rates (a tail phenomenon) are of interest. 
(2) Use the quantile regression models to estimate counterfactual distributions of foreclosure 
rates in county A when demographic characteristics are as in county B. (3) Use the 
counterfactuals to decompose foreclosure rate differentials across counties into two 
components: one due to differences in the levels of neighborhood characteristics (covariates) 
and the second due to differences in the model coefficients.  
The analysis is performed using foreclosure filing rates at the census tract level for three 
counties: Cuyahoga and Franklin in Ohio, and Allegheny in Pennsylvania. The geographic 
proximity and demographic similarity of these counties (table 1) provides a good ground for 
comparing their less similar foreclosure rate distributions. Models for within and across 
state foreclosure rate differences allow capturing state level effects on foreclosure rate 
distributions. And while regulatory variables are not explicitly included in the model, they 
are likely to be among the most important state-level effects. 
(1) Quantile regression models of foreclosure rates 
Most research on determinants of high foreclosure rates at the regional level use regression 
analysis to estimate the relationship of neighborhood and loan characteristics and/or 
regulation with the mean foreclosure rate or a function of it. This approach is appropriate 
when the focus is on neighborhoods with average foreclosure rates, or when it is safe to 
assume that covariates equally determine foreclosure rates in high as in low foreclosure-
density neighborhoods. However, foreclosure rates exhibit wide variability across 
neighborhoods and part of the focus of this study is to understand what is different in high 
versus low foreclosure density areas. The fact that the impact of the covariates may vary 
with the concentration of foreclosures supports the use of quantile regression in this study.   4
Quantile regression allows estimating the relationship between covariates and foreclosure 
rates at any specified quantile of the distribution.  
(2) Counterfactual distributions 
The analysis goes further to explore how much of the foreclosure rate differential in these 
counties can be explained by borrower and neighborhood characteristics as opposed to 
other factors that may have contributed to the outcomes. In other words, how would 
Allegheny borrowers and neighborhoods have performed under Cuyahoga (Franklin) 
environment and vice versa? The environment here includes but is not restricted to laws 
and regulation regarding the mortgage market. Here again, the analysis is performed over 
the whole distribution of foreclosure rates rather than the mean only.  
(3) Decomposition of foreclosure rate differentials 
The methodology used is based on the Machado-Mata (2005) method (MM) to explain wage 
differentials across time or geography. The MM method allows decomposing the differences 
in the log wage distributions (across time or geography) in two parts: the first, explained by 
differences in the levels of relevant characteristics (such as education), and the second, 
explained by differences in the returns to those characteristics. Returns, in this case, measure 
the relevance or value attached to characteristics such as education by each geography or 
time period, as measured by wages.  
Similarly, one is able to decompose the differences in foreclosure filing rates across two 
counties into two parts. One component of the rate differential is due to differences in the 
level of neighborhood characteristics or covariates. An example of a level measure is the 
percent of borrowers with low credit score in the neighborhood. The second component, 
however, has to do with the way the county values (penalizes) these characteristics, as   5
measured by lower (higher) foreclosure rates. Factors that influence this second component 
include laws, regulations and state and city procedures regarding consumer protection.  
This approach contributes to current efforts to assess the impact of laws and regulation by 
means of indices of regulatory strength and enforcement as explanatory variables for 
subprime originations and foreclosure rates. For instance, a study by Bostic et al. (2008) 
construct state and local indices of anti-predatory lending laws to be used as explanatory 
variables of subprime originations. These indices include mini-HOEPA laws and older laws. 
Index values for Ohio are equal or larger than for Pennsylvania. In order to eliminate the 
effect of missing variables that might affect subprime originations across states, a border 
pair geographic sampling method is used. Mortgage broker laws and regulation have also 
been studied (Kleiner and Todd, 2007) based on state indicators. Indicators measure 
restrictiveness based on licensing and registration policies (Pahl, C. 2007) of mortgage 
brokers. The analysis is performed with state level regulatory-related indices. Here again, 
Ohio’s values are larger than Pennsylvania’s. Indices cannot avoid introducing subjectivity 
to the analysis to a greater or lesser extent. They represent a weighted or simple average of 
numerical values attached to certain characteristics of laws according to their level of 
relevance as determined by an expert. Indices are more likely to measure quantity over 
quality of regulations. While this study’s approach does not rely on the use of such indices, 
it does not isolate the effect of the legal and regulatory environment either. At best, it 
measures the impact of a broader set of norms and behaviors (or lack thereof) –in part 
governed by the legal and regulatory environment- on the distinct patterns in which 
foreclosures have taken place throughout the counties. Rather than making assumptions 
about the ways in which individual regulations combine to affect outcomes, this approach 
assumes that, all else being equal, a more effective regulatory environment will translate   6
into a decreased correlation between low income neighborhood characteristics and negative 
outcomes. Therefore, differences in regulations across states that impact foreclosure rates 
may be captured through differences in the strength of correlation of these variables with 
foreclosure rates (coefficient effect), while at the same time acknowledging the effect of 
differences in the level of neighborhood variables (covariate effect).  
 
II. Data and Methodology 
The least squares regression model has been referred to as a pure location shift model 
because it assumes that covariates x only affect the location, but neither scale nor shape of 
the conditional distribution of y (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). In that sense, a set of quantile 
regression models is less restrictive and better suited to characterize the conditional 
distribution of y throughout its entire range. A particular feature of quantile regression that 
appeals to the analysis of foreclosure rate data is that it is robust to extremes in the 
dependent variable (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Thus, it provides a more accurate 
description of the tails, which here represent high foreclosure rate regions, a main focus of 
this work. 
For each county, the following conditional quantile regression model is estimated: 
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where  p Q(y ) x is the pth conditional quantile of the (log odds) unduplicated foreclosure 
filing rate distribution in census tracts across the county,  1 y ln( z ( z)) =− .  y/ F (y ) x x  is 
the cumulative distribution function of y conditional on x. The explanatory variables or 
covariates x are as follows: percent population with no high school diploma, median 
income, percent of African American population, percent of vacant housing, percent of   7
population with low credit score, and percent of high cost loans. The first four variables are 
from the 2000 census. The credit variable is based on a sample of 2006 Equifax scores, where 
low credit is defined as being less than 639 points. The percent of high cost loans is from the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data (HMDA 2005) and includes all loans with annual 
percentage rate at least 3 percentage points greater than the yield of a treasury security of 
comparable maturity. All variables except the low credit percent are in logs to allow for a 
linear specification of (2.1).  The explanatory variables describe borrower and neighborhood, 
as well as loan characteristics. It is reasonable to hypothesize that loans made to individuals 
with lower levels of education, income and credit score are at a higher risk of foreclosure.  
At the neighborhood level, this translates into higher foreclosure rates. But even when 
accounting for income, race of the borrower (or race composition in neighborhoods) has 
been shown to be a significant regressor in explaining foreclosure risk and rates (Coulton et 
al., 2008; Mayer and Pence, 2008). Higher vacancy and abandonment rates signal higher 
housing market distress and is hypothesized to correlate with higher foreclosure rates. 
Similarly, higher levels of high cost loans in a neighborhood are may lead to higher chances 
of predatory lending, and therefore, higher foreclosure levels. Other variables tested but not 
included to avoid multicolinearity were percent of unemployment, population below 
poverty, and percent of loans issued by subprime lenders (HMDA definition).  
A set of parameters  05 ,p ,p , β β K for any p value between 0 and 1 estimates the effect of the 
independent variables at the pth quantile of the (log odds) foreclosure rate distribution. For a 
sample of size n, the parameter vector  () 05 p, p , p , ββ ′ = β K is calculated to minimize the 
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Here, yi is the sample (log odds ratio) foreclosure rate for census tract i and xi is the vector of 
explanatory variables for census tract i. When p is 0.5, (2.1) is a median regression and 
parameters estimated by minimizing (2.2) are known as MAD (mean absolute deviation) 
estimators. Quantile regression, thus, allows characterizing the effects of the covariates at 
different points of the conditional distribution of foreclosure rates for census tracts in a given 
county. Parameter estimates for each covariate can be plotted against their corresponding 
quantiles with empirical confidence bands displaying their statistical significance and the 
strength of their correlation with the dependent variable throughout its entire distribution.  
The unconditional or marginal distribution of (log odds ratio) foreclosure rates in county A, 
consistent with model (2.1) can be estimated according to the MM method. The probability 
integral transformation theorem states that if y is a continuous random variable with 
cumulative distribution function F(y), then  01 p F(y) Uniform( , ) =   . A corollary of this 
theorem implies that 
1
p QF ( p ) F ( y )
− =   , provided the inverse CDF of y exists. Thus, if p 
is randomly chosen from a  01 Uniform( , ) , and assuming model (2.1) holds, it follows that  
pi p Q ′ = x β is a random value from the conditional distribution of y given xi. Then, an 
estimated sample from the marginal distribution of log odds foreclosure rates is obtained by 
bootstrapping from the sample x’s and computing { }
1
(i) p (i)
i. . . . m =
′ x β . This is equivalent to 
integrating x out of the conditional sample. The process is as follows:   9
(1) generate a random sample of m values in (0, 1) and use sample  
1 n , ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ Xxx K and y in A to estimate the corresponding sets of quantile parameters 
p( 1) p( 2) p( m ) (,, ) = βββ β K  
(2) generate a bootstrap sample of covariates from { }
1 i i,, n = x
K
(in A) of size m, 
1 () ( m ) ,, ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
m Xx x K  







This gives a sample of size m from the unconditional log odds ratio of foreclosure rates 
distribution in A as predicted by the model
A A ˆ y( z ; ) X , from which the distribution of 
foreclosure rates 
A A
ˆ f(z ; ) X  can be characterized.  
A similar procedure is used to obtain samples from counterfactual distributions, such as the 
foreclosure rate distribution that would have prevailed given covariates as in county B and 
parameters as in county A: 
(1) generate a random sample of m values in (0, 1) and use  1 n , ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ Xxx K and y in 
A to estimate the corresponding sets of quantile parameters 
p( 1) p( 2) p( m ) (,, ) = βββ β K  
 (2) generate a bootstrap sample of covariates from { }
1 i i,, n = x
K
 (in B) of size m, 
1 () ( m ) ,, ′ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦
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This constitutes a sample of size m from the (counterfactual) unconditional log odds ratio of 
foreclosure rates distribution that would have prevailed in A if covariates would have been 
distributed as in B. This counterfactual distribution is estimated by the model
A B ˆ y( z ; ) X , 
from which the distribution of foreclosure rates 
AB
ˆ f(z ; ) X  can be characterized. In both 
cases, the sample size m is 4000. 
This analysis is of interest because the quantile parameter variation across counties 
responds to variations in the way each county values or penalizes borrower and loan 
characteristics. Take for instance Cuyahoga covariates, i.e. the percent of high cost loans, 
percent of high school graduated, etc. How would have foreclosure rates been distributed in 
Allegheny and Franklin if covariates in these counties had been as in Cuyahoga? And how 
much of the foreclosure rate difference is explained by differences in the covariates as 
opposed to differences in the parameters?  
To answer the latter question, assume random samples corresponding to the following 
marginal distributions in Cuyahoga (C) and Allegheny (A) have been computed using the 
MM method: 
CC AA CA AC ˆˆˆˆ y( z ; ),y( z ; ),y( z ; ),y( z ; ) XXXX . 
If the function α is a summary statistic_ say the median of the sample_ then the actual (log 
odds ratio) foreclosure rate difference is the estimated difference plus a residual: 
  CAC CA A ˆˆ (y (z )) (y (z )) (y (z ; )) (y (z ; )) α αα α ε −= − + XX  (2.3) 
Adding and subtracting 
CA ˆ y( z ; ) X to the right hand side of (2.3) and grouping terms results 
in:  
CA
CA AA CC CA
(y (z )) (y (z ))
ˆˆ ˆˆ (y (z ; )) (y (z ; )) (y (z ; )) (y (z ; ))
αα
α αα α ε
−=
−+−+ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ XX XX
 (2.4)   11
The first term in brackets measures the difference in the median value due to county 
parameter differences estimated by the model and given covariates as in A. The second term 
is the difference in the mean of rates due to county covariate level differences estimated by 
the model and given parameters as in C. A similar decomposition can be obtained by 
adding and subtracting the term
AC ˆ y( z ; ) X , only in this case, median differences due to 
county parameter differences are estimated given covariates as in C. Likewise, median 
differences due to county covariate level differences are estimated given parameters as in C. 
Although the decomposition technique has been described for the median, α represents any 
summary statistic, in particular quantiles.  Since the log odds ratio of foreclosure rates 
1 yl n ( f / ( f ) ) =−  is the dependent variable in the estimated model (2.1), the decomposition 
is done on this variable. The decomposition is applied to paired differentials for the three 
counties (Cuyahoga – Allegheny, Cuyahoga – Franklin, Allegheny – Franklin). Summary 
statistics computed are the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles.  
 
III. Results 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of 2007 foreclosure rates for the Allegheny, Cuyahoga, and 
Franklin counties. Foreclosure rates are calculated as 2007 unduplicated foreclosure filings1 
divided by the number of estimated mortgaged units in 2007. This latter estimate is an 
extrapolation of the 2006 American Community Survey estimate to 2007, assuming the 2006-
2007 mortgage growth rate equals the rate in 2000-2006. Foreclosure rates are for census 
tracts in the county with 50 or more estimated mortgaged units in 2007.  The distribution of 
                                                 
1 Filing data come from Allegheny County Prothonotary, Franklin County Common Pleas Court 
(provided by Community Research Partners), and the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court 
(provided by Cleveland State University). 
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census tract - foreclosure filling rates exhibits a larger variation in Franklin and Cuyahoga as 
compared to Allegheny. Differences in the distributions are even more apparent in census 
tracts with rates above the median filling rate. While Cuyahoga and Franklin distributions, 
both have longer right tails than Allegheny, this tail is heavier for Cuyahoga. Cuyahoga not 
only exhibits the highest mean foreclosure rate, but the largest variation as well. Table 1 
shows that mean foreclosure rate differences across counties is heavily affected by 
differences at quantiles larger than the median. Variables that are similarly distributed 
across counties are median income, percent vacant housing, and percent of population with 
low credit scores. Larger variations across counties hold for the percent of high school 
graduates, African Americans, and high cost loans, particularly above their respective 
median values. Variations for these variables, however, are not nearly as large as the 
foreclosure rate variations displayed.  
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the estimated model parameters from equation (2.1) plotted against 
the foreclosure rate quantile range for Allegheny, Cuyahoga and Franklin counties 
respectively. 90% confidence bands are displayed in blue. Covariates whose parameters are 
consistently significant through most of the quantile range and for all counties are the low 
credit score percent and high cost loans percent.  The variable measuring percent of vacant 
properties in the tract is positive and significant through most of the range for Cuyahoga 
and Franklin. In Cuyahoga (and to a lesser extent in Franklin) the impact of vacancy 
increases as foreclosure rates increase. It is interesting to note that while Allegheny reported 
slightly higher levels of vacancy in 2000 as compared to the other counties, this variable 
does not explain foreclosure rates in 2007. The fact that 2000 vacancy patterns in Cuyahoga 
and Franklin are consistent indicators of foreclosure rates in 2007 is suggestive of the 
persistence and relevance of vacancy and abandonment in these counties. On the other   13
hand, the impact of % high cost loans and % population with low credit score tends to 
decrease in general for the three counties as foreclosure rates increase, indicating a concave 
relationship between foreclosure rates and these neighborhood characteristics.   
In Allegheny county parameters for median income and percent of African American 
population are insignificant, while the percent in the tract with no high school diploma is 
significant in explaining foreclosure rates. Franklin County exhibits a similar pattern, only 
that parameters for median income and African American percent are larger in magnitude 
and even significant around the 70th quantile of foreclosure rates. On the contrary, in 
Cuyahoga, parameters for median income and percent African American are significant 
through most of the range, but the percent of high school graduates variable looses 
relevance. While median income is similar across counties, census tracts in Cuyahoga 
display a larger degree of geographic concentration of African American population (table 
1), particularly in neighborhoods hardest hit by foreclosures.  
Table 2 presents quantiles for the actual and estimated county distributions of foreclosure 
rates, as well as for the counterfactual distributions derived with the MM method applied to 
model (2.1). The estimated distribution of rates closely matches the actual distribution for 
the three counties. It is not surprising to see that if covariate levels in Franklin and 
Allegheny had been as in Cuyahoga, foreclosure rates in the two counties would have been 
higher (see Cuyahoga characteristics in Franklin and Allegheny). Note however that higher 
rates are less noticeable for census tracts with foreclosure rates below the median. The 
increase in foreclosure rates is apparent in above median tracts for both counties, with the 
counterfactual Franklin rates moving closer to the actual Cuyahoga rates. It is worth 
noticing that while Franklin and Allegheny counties responded quite differently to 
Cuyahoga covariates at the higher end of the distribution (quantiles 75 and 90), Cuyahoga   14
would have valued (penalized) Franklin and Allegheny covariates more homogeneously. 
This can be seen by comparing quantiles in table 2 for the counterfactual distributions 
corresponding to Franklin covariates in Cuyahoga and Allegheny covariates in Cuyahoga.  
Table 3 presents the decomposition analysis of the (log odds ratio) foreclosure rate 
differences. The previous section outlined the decomposition method and referred to two 
equally valid ways to decompose rate differences into coefficient and covariate effects. 
Equation (2.4) is one of them and measures the covariate effect on Cuyahoga parameters. 
Results of this decomposition are presented in table 3. All terms in equation (2.4) are 
computed for the usual quantile levels. The first column corresponds to quantiles for the 
actual (log odds ratio) foreclosure rate difference between any two counties. The second 
column specifies the quantile. The third and fifth columns correspond to the estimated 
coefficient and covariate effect terms of the equation, and the seventh column calculates the 
residual at each of the quantiles. Columns four, six and eight express each of the three terms 
in (2.4) as a proportion of the actual rate difference (first column), giving a sense of the 
comparative relevance of both effects. Proportions are calculated independently of each 
other and are neither expected to add to 1 nor be restricted to the (0, 1) range. 90% bootstrap 
confidence intervals are provided for each quantile difference and corresponding effects. 
These are based on 3000 bootstrap samples. 
The Cuyahoga - Franklin decomposition reveals that for census tracts with median 
foreclosure rates and below, the covariate effect is much smaller than the parameter effect. 
For this range of tracts, the difference in levels of the explanatory variables account for little 
of the difference between foreclosure rates in the two counties. At the 25th quantile the 
negative covariate effect indicates that covariate levels would have contributed to higher 
foreclosure rates in Franklin than in Cuyahoga, although this estimate is statistically   15
undistinguishable from zero. However, in connection to this result it should be noticed that 
foreclosure rate differences in this range are relatively small as compared to the upper half 
of the distribution. In fact, for the 25th and 50th quantiles, differences between the two 
counties are statistically insignificant. In short, the fact that Franklin and Cuyahoga 
foreclosure rates are fairly similar in this range dilutes the relevance of the decomposition. 
However, at the upper end of the distribution covariates and coefficients have a statistically 
equal effect (75th quantile) or the covariate effect dominates the coefficient effect (90th 
quantile). The Cuyahoga - Allegheny and Franklin – Allegheny comparisons reveal a 
different decomposition pattern. Although differences in the levels of the explanatory 
variables play a part in explaining foreclosure rate differentials, the main component of the 
rate differential is given by differences in the coefficients for all quantiles considered. In 
other words, in contrast to Cuyahoga and Franklin, Allegheny environment values or 
penalizes the neighborhood characteristics studied differently as measured by foreclosure 
rates. This difference in environments is a main driver of the foreclosure rate differentials 




The distribution of census tract - foreclosure filling rates exhibits a larger variation in 
Franklin and Cuyahoga as compared to Allegheny with much of the distribution differences 
taking place in census tracts with rates above the median filling rate. Thus, a quantile, rather 
than a mean approach is taken to model and compare rates across counties. Variables 
explaining foreclosure rates that are consistently significant throughout the quantile range 
are credit score and high cost loans.  Even when accounting for income and education level,   16
the percent of African Americans in a census tract remains significant for the Cuyahoga 
County model only. This fact along with the high levels of geographic concentration of 
foreclosures in the county suggests that the spillover effects of the foreclosure crisis will be 
more pronounced for African Americans in Cuyahoga. Vacancy rates in 2000 are significant 
predictors of foreclosure rates in Cuyahoga and Franklin reflecting the persistence of 
unhealthy neighborhood conditions.  
Although the three counties are demographically similar, Cuyahoga has higher levels of 
variables positively correlated to foreclosures rates and lower levels of variables negatively 
correlated to foreclosure rates. Thus, it is expected that foreclosure rate differences between 
Cuyahoga and the other counties will be due in part to differences in the levels of these 
neighborhood variables. However, only for the (within state) Cuyahoga – Franklin 
comparison is that the difference in levels mainly explains rate differentials. This is not so 
for the (between states) Allegheny-Cuyahoga and Allegheny - Franklin comparisons, 
suggesting state level effects are at play. Differences in the legal and regulatory environment 
across states could provide a partial explanation to this finding, assuming that compared to 
Ohio, Pennsylvania’s regulatory environment is more conducive to better underwriting 
standards, higher quality of originations, and/or better consumer protection law. However, 
studies of the legal and regulatory environment based on indices rate Ohio as more 
regulated than Pennsylvania.  
At a time when regulations are being proposed and amended to address the current 
mortgage crisis this study stresses the need for further research in the area of laws and 
regulations, and the measurement of their effectiveness.    17
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         Allegheny  Cuyahoga  Franklin 
           
2007 Foreclosure Rate    mean  2.43 7.96  5.12 
 (County Records)    p10  0.66 1.16  0.83 
     p25  1.10 1.97  1.62 
     p50  1.95 4.59  3.78 
     p75  3.39 10.50  6.18 
     p90  4.92 19.70 11.56 
Percent with No High School Diploma  mean  14.90 20.38  16.47 
  (Census, 2000)    p10  5.49 5.47  3.06 
     p25  9.14 9.66  6.02 
     p50  13.77 17.92  13.02 
     p75  19.04 29.99  25.05 
     p90  25.06 39.68  34.77 
Median Income ($1000’s)    mean  40.00 41.97  44.06 
  (Census, 2000)    p10  21.65 19.86  23.97 
     p25  27.87 26.46  30.21 
     p50  37.12 38.85  39.98 
     p75  46.76 50.68  55.03 
     p90  61.22 68.61  70.63 
Percent of African Americans    mean  15.35 31.72  21.68 
  (Census, 2000)    p10  0.50 0.46  1.11 
     p25  1.08 1.37  2.83 
     p50  3.42 10.77  9.17 
     p75  14.79 64.51  29.22 
     p90  63.33 97.63  69.09 
Percent of Vacant Housing Units    mean  8.40 7.65  7.01 
 (Census, 2000)    p10  2.65 2.27  2.45 
     p25  4.01 3.27  3.63 
     p50  5.71 5.35  5.57 
     p75  11.01 10.88  8.85 
     p90  17.27 15.76  13.10 
Percent of Population with Low     mean  23.35 26.62  25.75 
Credit Score (Equifax, 2006)    p10  8.47 8.07  9.57 
     p25  12.03 13.83  17.17 
     p50  20.70 27.19  26.92 
     p75  31.77 38.66  34.56 
     p90  44.58 44.44  40.27 
Percent of High Cost Loans    mean  27.43 36.24  32.35 
 (HMDA, 2005)    p10  10.63 12.06  10.33 
     p25  16.19 17.78  15.63 
     p50  25.71 31.04  31.38 
      p75  36.54 53.16  46.39 
    p90  46.67 68.75  56.73 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of borrower, neighborhood, and loan characteristics 
Foreclosure rate is defined as unduplicated foreclosure filing rates in a census tract with 50 
or more estimated mortgaged units in 2007.    19
 
                          
           Counterfactuals: Cuyahoga Characteristics 
Cuyahoga  Actual  Estimated    in Franklin  in Allegheny      
                   
   p10  1.16  1.19   0.89  0.67      
   p25  1.97  2.02   1.62  1.25      
   p50  4.59  4.38   3.55  2.58      
   p75  10.50  10.63   8.28  5.09      
   p90  19.70  19.57   15.09  7.59      
                   
           Counterfactuals: Franklin Characteristics 
Franklin   Actual  Estimated    in Cuyahoga  in Allegheny      
                   
   p10  0.83  0.84   1.22  0.63      
   p25  1.62  1.64   2.11  1.18      
   p50  3.78  3.50   4.28  2.41      
   p75  6.18  6.58   7.99  4.25      
   p90  11.56  10.74   13.26  5.84      
                   
           Counterfactuals: Allegheny Characteristics 
Allegheny   Actual  Estimated    in Cuyahoga   in Franklin      
                   
   p10  0.66  0.63   1.17  0.82      
   p25  1.10  1.09   1.93  1.44      
   p50  1.95  1.95   3.60  2.91      
   p75  3.40  3.35   7.06  5.86      
   p90  4.92  5.04     11.64  10.41       
               
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for estimated and counterfactual distributions of foreclosure 
rates 
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Foreclosure Rate Difference  Coefficient Effect  Covariate  Effect    Residual  
              
Cuyahoga -Franklin    (on Franklin covariates)          
     p      p      p 
                  
0.34 p10  0.38  1.10   -0.03  -0.09   0.00  -0.01 
(0.20, 0.59)    (0.34, 0.42)      (-0.08, 0.02)         
0.20 p25  0.26  1.31    -0.03  -0.17    -0.03  -0.14 
(0.00, 0.40)    (0.22, 0.29)      (-0.10, 0.01)         
0.20 p50  0.21  1.04    0.01  0.05    -0.02  -0.08 
(-0.04, 0.45)    (0.17, 0.24)      (-0.05, 0.06)         
0.58 p75  0.21  0.36    0.25  0.43    0.12  0.20 
(0.39, 0.77)    (0.18, 0.25)      (0.18, 0.31)         
0.63 p90  0.24  0.38    0.45  0.71   -0.06  -0.09 
(0.36, 0.93)    (0.20, 0.27)      (0.39, 0.49)         
            
Cuyahoga-Allegheny  (on Allegheny covariates)          
                   
0.57   p10  0.61  1.08   0.01  0.02    -0.06  -0.10 
(0.42, 0.76)      (0.55, 0.64)     (-0.02,  0.07)         
0.59   p25  0.56  0.96   0.04  0.07    -0.02  -0.03 
(0.47, 0.76)      (0.52, 0.59)     (0.03,  0.12)         
0.88   p50  0.63  0.72   0.20  0.23   0.05  0.05 
(0.67, 1.02)      (0.59, 0.65)     (0.14,  0.25)         
1.20   p75  0.80  0.67   0.45  0.37    -0.05  -0.04 
(1.05, 1.36)      (0.74, 0.81)     (0.32,  0.45)         
1.56   p90  0.94  0.60   0.61  0.39   0.00  0.00 
(1.42, 1.71)      (0.92, 1.00)      (0.47, 0.59)         
              
Franklin-Allegheny  (on Allegheny covariates)          
                   
0.23   p10  0.25  1.12   0.02  0.11    -0.05  -0.23 
(-0.03, 0.42)      (0.20, 0.29)     (-0.02,  0.09)         
0.39   p25  0.28  0.73   0.13  0.33    -0.02  -0.06 
(0.20, 0.61)      (0.25, 0.32)     (0.08,  0.18)         
0.68   p50  0.41  0.60   0.19  0.28   0.08  0.12 
(0.44, 0.83)      (0.38, 0.45)     (0.13,  0.24)         
0.63   p75  0.58  0.93   0.12  0.20    -0.08  -0.13 
(0.47, 0.78)      (0.54, 0.62)     (0.07,  0.18)         
0.93   p90  0.78  0.85   0.03  0.04   0.11  0.12 
(0.64, 1.19)      (0.74, 0.82)      (0.00, 0.09)         
                   
 
Table 3. Decomposition of changes in (log odds ratio) foreclosure rate distribution by 
coefficient and covariate effects    21
 
Figure 1: Histograms of 2007 Foreclosure Rates for Allegheny, Cuyahoga, and Franklin 
Counties. Foreclosure rate is defined as the number of unduplicated foreclosure filings per 
mortgaged units in a census tract with 50 or more estimated mortgaged units in 2007.  














Figure 4: Quantile Parameter Estimates for Franklin Foreclosure Rates 